Javier Milei, an anti-system outsider with only two years of political experience, shot to fame with a self-proclaimed messianic mission: “End inflation forever, end insecurity forever, end the privileges of politicians forever.”
To demonstrate what he meant, he wielded a chainsaw on campaign rallies, symbolising his plans to cut down state spending. The dramatic symbolism worked: his coalition La Libertad Avanza (Liberty Advances) won a landslide victory in 20 of Argentina’s 23 provinces, as well as in the capital, Buenos Aires. With rhetoric out of the Trumpian playbook, he has promised to “return Argentina to the place in the world it should never have lost” as a world power, and blamed the economic crisis on the overspending of the “impoverishing model of the omnipresent State.”
In short, Milei promised to "make Argentina Great Again," reminiscent of 100 years ago, when the phrase "rich like an Argentine" was actually a thing. With his scathing criticism of the political class (or ‘casta’), in his campaigning Milei was able to capture the desperation and resentment felt by millions of Argentines struggling to make ends meet. Argentina faces painful 140% annual inflation, which is expected to reach 200% by early next year, a 40% poverty rate and the impacts of Covid and lengthy lockdowns that are still crippling the floundering economy.
But how did Milei manage to break Argentina’s almost hundred year old love affair with Peronism? During the strict and lengthy Covid lockdowns of Alberto Fernández’s Peronist government, Milei emerged into politics on the margins and founded the political coalition La Libertad Avanza in 2021. Latching on to anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine policy sentiment and the desperation of informal workers (almost 50% of Argentina’s work force) who felt neglected by state relief policies, Milei became a TikTok phenomenon and gained traction, particularly amongst young men disillusioned with the age-long promises of Peronist governments.
In this context, Milei positioned himself as the candidate for drastic and much-needed change. His most radical proposals include dynamiting the Central Bank, dollarising the economy and abolishing the sovereign Argentine peso. He also plans to shrink the state by closing at least 10 of the 18 government ministries, including those of Health, Education and the Environment.
Here he explains his plans for getting rid of entire ministries, including those of Health and Education...
Whilst he is known for his inflammatory and aggressive rhetoric, which includes denouncing Pope Francis and defining climate change as “a socialist hoax,” many voted for him out of pure desperation and anger amid Argentina’s economic crisis, rather than out of adherence to his far-right and perhaps post-neoliberal ideology.
Argentina is no stranger to political mood swings and is known for its extreme oscillation between different economic policies depending on the government. However, Milei, with his radical libertarian ideology, seeing the state as the ultimate enemy, will likely bring Argentina into uncharted waters.
The new president’s impact on Argentina will most likely be seen in the realms of the economy, human rights and the country’s position in international relations.
Argentina is the second-largest economy in South America after Brazil, and the outcome and impact of Milei’s presidency will hinge on perceptions of how he runs it. His plan to solve the country’s chronic inflation through dollarisation, joining El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador, the only three Latin American countries who have done the same, is extremely expensive and unlikely to solve the country’s structural economic problems and could lead to further misery.
Analysts have pointed out that Argentina lacks the dollars to dollarise, as well as the financial credibility on international markets to borrow enough of the currency, which means the proposal is unlikely to actually work. Milei could theoretically approach the International Monetary Fund, notorious in Argentina for representing the country’s colossal debt burden, but there is little chance of success there either.
As pointed out by Larry Elliot, Economics editor at The Guardian, “Argentina is already the biggest borrower from the IMF and owes it $44bn.” Whilst dollarising is popular amidst some parts of the population, especially considering paying in dollars is already part of daily life for many in Argentina, the proposal has also attracted criticism from some sectors for effectively turning Argentina into a US colony.
Milei’s pledges to privatise all state-owned enterprises “and open up the [Argentine] economy to the world” are also unlikely to relieve the huge poverty and inequality in the country. The constant pressure of economic ruin could break Milei, as the voter anger which led to his popularity could easily turn against him if he does not deliver on his campaign promises or remedy the ailing economy.
In fact, governability will be a huge challenge for Milei, not least because of his lack of experience, but also because of his lack of representation in Congress. He controls about 15% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 8 out of 72 seats in the Senate. This means he may not be able to pass some of his more radical proposals. Given his anti-establishment rhetoric he may struggle to collaborate with other politicians, crucially the powerful provincial governors, as Argentina is a federal country. Furthermore, unlike Bolsonaro with the evangelicals in Brazil, Milei lacks a core base that he can reliably organise to support him. His diverse support could fracture and prove difficult to manage.
At the same time, it is the uncertainty and lack of previous historical examples to compare him to that made Milei such an attractive option, a break from the political cycles of the past. Juan Luis González at the Buenos Aires Herald commented that “no-one can accurately predict what kind of country is coming with the incoming government. That is a reality, moreover, exacerbated by Milei’s own unstable personality.” The only thing certain is his belief that God spoke to him in 2020 during the pandemic to become President and fix the economy.
However, as written in The Economist, “in order to slash public spending by the amount that he promises, Mr Milei will have to touch the most sensitive parts of Argentina’s economy,” such as education and healthcare, which are free to access at all levels and employ millions of citizens.
It is important to remember that only one in three of Argentina’s non-Peronist presidents were able to finish their mandate since the return of democracy in 1983. The others were forced out of office early because of mass protests. Milei will need to ensure that he can “build a national consensus about economic reform in order to ensure that his policies do not result in Argentines taking to the streets,” which by most indicators are unlikely. In addition, based on some of his public appearances, Milei's volatile mental state has raised questions about his ability to govern through a crisis.
On the international stage, Milei will position Argentina as very pro-US. In Milei’s own words: “Our geopolitical alignment is with the United States and Israel. That’s our international policy. We won’t align with communists.” On his victory, Milei received joyful congratulations from leaders of the far-right in Europe such as from Vox in Spain who described celebrating “in Spain with a special joy,” Trump in the US with the words “you will turn your country around and truly Make Argentina Great Again,” and Bolsonaro in Brazil, who wrote on Twitter/X “Hope shines again in South America.”
Milei's presidency could potentially lead to emboldening a surge in far-right politics in Latin America. Milei also plans to dramatically break trade ties with Brazil and China (representing 40% of Argentina’s total trade) and align even closer to the US for ideological reasons. He is also highly unlikely to accept the invitation to join the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which previous President Alberto Fernández described as “a great opportunity” for the country.
Argentina’s standing as a world leader in human rights diplomacy will also be significantly challenged by Milei’s presidency. For the first time since the return of democracy to Argentina in 1983, Milei has challenged the nation’s consensus on the significance of the last military dictatorship from 1976-1983. He has publicly disputed and downplayed the violence of the dictatorship, claiming “there were 8,753” victims, as opposed to the estimated 30,000 killed and disappeared, opening deep and painful wounds in Argentina.
Particularly concerning is the positioning of running mate Victoria Villaruel in charge of defence and security. Coming from a military family and consistently refusing to use the word “dictatorship” to refer to the period of military rule and justifying its crimes as committed against “terrorists,” professor Jacqueline Behrend described her role in government as “a reason for concern because in Argentina we have laws that state that the military can’t be in charge of internal security issues.” Her strong affiliation with the military poses serious questions about the erosion of the “democratic consensus regarding human rights violations that was established after the transition to democracy in 1983.”
Only earlier this year, UNESCO gave World Heritage Status to the ESMA Museum and Site of Memory in Buenos Aires, the former naval school used by the dictatorship as a centre for torture and extermination. Granted to honour the memory of “nunca más” (never again), in painful irony, for the first time an Argentine government is now publicly questioning the systematic violence of the dictatorship. As said by Argentine author Uki Goñi, “rethinking the dictatorship was unimaginable only a few months ago.”
Milei has also challenged same-sex marriage (legalised in 2010) and has vowed to repeal Argentina’s historic legalisation of abortion, achieved in 2020 after a years-long campaign that gripped the nation and set an example for other Latin American countries. Milei’s rhetoric denouncing social justice movements means he has also targeted the country’s ministry of women, gender and diversity for closure, and is symbolic of his plans to dismantle Peronist institutions and infrastructure. Milei’s aggressive rhetoric, which breaks the post-dictatorship consensus, is likely to increase fear and polarisation in the country and could lead to political violence, troubled further by Milei’s proposals to relax gun ownership laws.
Milei will take office on 10 December 2023. It remains to be seen how far Milei will go with his proposals and how he will manage voter expectations and resentment. Expect uncertainty, polarisation and dramatic fiscal adjustment.
